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Abstract 
 
Probably the most challenging issue in science and advanced technology is the ever 
increasing complexity. The term complexity refers to the experience that the complex 
whole is more than the sum of the parts. Emergence of new properties is observed at 
all levels, from relatively simple physical systems up to high-end evolution in biology 
or state-of-the-art microprocessors in technology. In this study an effort is made to 
arrive at an understanding of the underlying ontological basis in terms of the classical 
philosophy of Aristotle and Aquinas. In addition, the value of philosophy is 
emphasized as a means to develop the capacity for intuition. Only with this capacity it 
is possible to acquire an understanding of the great variety of concepts needed in the 
multidisciplinary approach to complex systems. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Many of us have played with mechanical toys as children, mostly nicely arranged in a 
box. The challenge then was to build your own small car, elevator or other things just 
by screwing and putting together all the small parts. Getting older you could use more 
parts and tackle advanced problems like a car with a small motor and gears. This step 
was not just adding more parts. The interaction between movable parts went beyond a 
simple relation where only two or three degrees of freedom were involved. It was 
becoming a complex problem that exceeded the intellectual capacity of an eight-year-
old child. 
 
    Science and technology in a certain sense is repeating this experience. We are now 
increasingly confronted with scientific problems that, solvable in principle, need 
nevertheless new approaches. We understand, e.g., quite well the properties of a 
transistor. The interaction, however, of more than a billion of them in a state-of-the-
art microprocessor is only known approximately. Figure 1 illustrates the traditional 
'ideal' approach to high level science. In a static approach a broad basis is laid of 
fundamental knowledge. Layer by layer, higher levels of increasingly applied 
knowledge and diminishing extension can be obtained ending up with the desired 
high-tech extremely specialized application. The interaction between the layers is in 
this standard approach restricted only to the nearest lower or higher layer. This 
approach seems to be very attractive, it fulfils the Cartesian demand of clare et 
distincte (clear and distinct). The progress in knowledge is based on understanding the 
supporting layer. It is completely controllable and based on a solid basis of knowledge 
where the next step is only taken after a thorough understanding of the previous layer. 
The problem now is that it does not work in practice -the number and lifetime of 
scientists are limited- nor in theory, as the whole is more than the parts as will be 
shown below. 
extension of research activity
basic knowledge
applied knowledge
 
Figure 1: Conventional, static approach in order to arrive at the specialized 
knowledge needed in high-tech applied science. 
 
    Coming back to the example of modern microprocessors, we observe that we do 
not know in detail all the properties of the building block, a single transistor. The 
behavior of millions of them, nevertheless, is sufficiently understood to start a 
technological development comparable in impact to the 19th century industrial 
revolution: the information technology. 
 
    A recent symposium organized by the Pontifical Academy of Science dealt with 
Complexity and Analogy in Science (Arber et al. 2015). Several ideas forwarded in 
this symposium support the approach in the present study. A few contributions will be 
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explicitly quoted, when it leads to a better understanding or when acknowledgment 
would be justified. As an example one could mention Pierre Léna who described in 
the following words the challenge for the traditional approach in science (Léna 2014): 
The traditional model of science education - disciplinary, analytical and deductive - is 
challenged by the complexity of the world to be deciphered and the complexity of the science 
to be communicated. 
 
    In the following section we try to obtain on the basis of a few examples some 
characteristics of complexity in science and technology. In a previous study, issues 
regarding complexity in biological systems have been analyzed with a comparable 
philosophical approach (Driessen 2015).  
 
2. Complexity in Science and Technology 
 
The first striking sensation one experiences in a high tech environment is its 
multidisciplinary setting (Driessen 1995). As an example one could remind the above 
mentioned microprocessor chip. It is based on physical phenomena that only can be 
understood in terms of solid state physics based on quantum mechanics. The design of 
such a device is the field of electrical engineering, information science and applied 
mathematics. The production is based on advanced optical lithography in conjunction 
with mostly chemical deposition and etching technology. Advances in the field are the 
result of detailed studies involving the systematization of a large number of empirical 
results. As a consequence, no single scientist is able to have a complete knowledge 
representing the state-of-the-art of the relevant fields. Each discipline has to 
contribute to a complex whole that a single human mind is not able to understand on 
its own. The specialization and the extension of the knowledge base is so far 
developed that even within a single discipline hundreds and even thousands of 
scientists are working simultaneously to arrive at the desired technological product or 
system. In addition new generations of the product are following each other with 
increasing speed. If a microprocessor producer, for example, is not able to deliver an 
improved type within a few months, he will lose within short time his leading 
position. This means that research and development, intuitively considered open 
ended, is done in a project environment with tight deadlines and milestones.  
 
    The above given example can be extended to even more dizzying proportions by 
considering that meanwhile thousands of millions of microprocessors are connected 
on a global scale. They interact in the probably most complex man-made 
technological system, the World-Wide-Web. This, in fact, can be considered as one 
single distributed computer system. The number of disciplines and not to say the 
number of scientist contributing to its development is exceeding any extrapolation 
made only some decades ago. 
 
    Considering now complex systems in general, one can distinguish several 
characteristic properties (Burgers 2011): 
- One does not encounter a single preferential level of detail that allows the 
adequate description of the system. Instead one has to work with several levels 
of description. 
- On the micro level the system consists of a very large number of separate 
elements that interact with each other. 
- There is emergent behavior, a spontaneously arising activity at the higher level. 
This activity at the macro level with new structures and interaction is not the 
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result of external control and is not directly reducible to the properties of the 
micro-elements. 
 
    Going from the object of research to the subject, the engineer or scientist, one also 
encounters the challenge of complexity. In fact, the human person can be considered 
as a complex system. Melanie Mitchell writes in the introduction of a textbook 
Complexity, a Guided Tour (Mitchell 2009): 
One of my motivations was in fact, how people think – how abstract reasoning, emotions, 
creativity, and even consciousness emerge from trillions of tiny brain cells and their electrical 
and chemical communications. […] It was becoming clear that the reductionist approach to 
cognition was misguided – we just couldn’t understand [how thinking arises from brain 
activity] at the level of individual neurons, synapses, and the like. Therefore, although I didn’t 
yet know how to call it, the program of complex systems resonated strongly with me. 
 
    One could ask how to prepare the future scientist or engineer for the challenging 
tasks in the increasingly complex technical environment. P. Léna states that one 
should already start at the age of children and gives a few suggestions for their basic 
education (Léna 2014). A special type of person is needed in order to overcome the 
pyramid paradigm of Fig. 1. About 25 years ago an inquiry has been made among 
Dutch companies that employ scientists for their Research and Development 
departments. The following two quotations from different reports indicate a trend in 
accordance with the changing world of science as described above. An advisory 
commission stated in 1992 (AWT 1992):  
Companies have the experience that recently graduated scientists are not able to combine and 
integrate the knowledge of the different disciplines. 
Another commission concluded specifically about the role of physicists in 1994 (de 
Vries 1994):  
Physicists must put more effort in learning to work in a multidisciplinary environment and 
within multi-disciplinary projects.  
 
    Meanwhile Universities and other educational institutes have followed these 
recommendations and changed drastically the teaching methods. They reduced 
classical lectures and introduced alternative forms like working in multidisciplinary 
project-groups, performing case studies and stimulating students to work as trainee in 
a real-life professional environment. In this transition, multimedia technology and 
instantaneous access to ever increasing knowledge databases have surely played an 
important facilitating role. 
 
    In order to arrive at an analysis of this new situation originated by the increasing 
complexity of science and technology one has to move to a meta-level that transcends 
the realm of science, see e.g., (Arecchi 1997). Psychology and sociology could 
contribute to this analysis but being a discipline among many others, they are not able 
to provide the desired 'helicopter-view'. Philosophy is a better candidate as it can 
assess the role of the different disciplines and, especially, provides an ontological 
basis of complex systems. The observation of Strumia supports this view (Strumia 
2007): 
Complexity, whole and parts, dynamics, attractors, chaos, order, information, self-
organization, teleonomy, finality, project, intelligence, mind, concept, self-similarity, analogy, 
etc., are the new words arising today, practically, inside any science. They sound similar, even 
if not identical, to some (Latin) terms of ancient (Greek and Mediaeval) philosophy of nature, 
metaphysics and logic: complexio, totum et partes, motus, quies, ordo, forma, finis, intellectus, 
anima, intentio, similitudo, analogia (entis), etc. 
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    It is obvious that one has to select an adequate philosophical approach. Ancient 
Geek atomism, for example, would not be sufficient as it focusses mainly on the 
constituent parts, the atoms. Like in the reductionist approach the ontological basis of 
the emerging properties at the higher level is then only weakly given. To find a 
suitable coherent philosophy, or more specific a coherent metaphysics, is a great 
challenge. But it is crucial to arrive at a view on reality that makes complexity 
intelligible. The complex artificial or natural being is not just more of the same. Its 
phenomenological richness cannot be reduced to the multiplied simplicity of the 
building blocks.  
 
    Our tentative philosophy of complex science (section 5) is based on an analysis of 
the cognitive processes in human beings (section 3). It is shown that the elaboration of 
concepts and the way one arrives at the understanding of the phenomena exceed the 
possibilities of a formalized, mathematical approach. In section 4 the ontological basis 
of complexity is given based on concepts of the classical philosophy of Aristotle and 
Aquinas: hylomorphism and the analogy of being. This approach takes into account 
the phenomenological richness of an object that with respect to its material principles 
is composed of simple building blocks. Based on the analogy of being and the 
distinction between material and formal principles a hierarchy is proposed in the 
material world. A similar hierarchy has been established by the Nobel Prize Winner 
P.W. Anderson (Anderson 1972). He illustrates with examples taken from physics 
that the whole is more than the sum of the constituent parts. Section 5 then, combines 
the results of the foregoing two sections and gives a brief discussion of some 
important aspects of our tentative philosophy of complexity. Finally we present in 
section 6 our conclusions. 
 
3. Cognitive processes in human beings 
 
In the case of human beings and animals the acquisition of knowledge about the outer 
world starts with the information supplied by the senses. The next steps in the 
information processing can be quite similar for both, men and animals. But only in the 
case of human beings it will eventually end up in notions or concepts. If a human 
being arrives at this stage he says, "I see", or "I understand". The concept is based on 
senses and reasoning, but there is more. A personal experience may serve as an 
illustration. Being 12 year old we learned on High School the basic concepts in 
physics. I could remember the difficulty I had to grasp the formal concept of 
acceleration. I had the experience of being moved in a car, or of a stone falling down 
due to gravity. But I could not understand our teacher when he made an analogy to 
velocity. This quantity can be defined as the change in position per unit of time and 
accordingly acceleration can be considered as the change of speed in unit of time. The 
formal concept of acceleration that allows the mathematical formulation of Newton's 
law was too much for me at that time. Only after some time and rethinking the 
arguments I was able to understand. I could grasp the meaning; I had, what the 
Germans call an 'Aha Erlebnis' (Eureka, I-see experience), a term coined by Karl 
Bühler. It is interesting to note that before that understanding I could apply the 
formulas and calculate the numerical value for the acceleration. 
 
    This is a very general situation well known to students of physics. One is able to 
follow all mathematical steps and to derive the correct results, but a real 
understanding of what one is doing is largely missing. In the case of the formalism of 
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quantum mechanics this quite unsatisfactory situation extends even to Nobel Prize 
Winners. Richard Feynman, a real genius, for example, states (Feynman 1965):  
 I think I can safely say that nobody today understands quantum mechanics. 
 
    Scientific work is more than the correct application of a certain formalism. In each 
branch of science a broad variety of concepts have been developed that are shared by 
the scientific community. These concepts are the basis of what is called the scientific 
language of this specific discipline. Concepts constitute the logical basis of judgments 
or statements. They are the building blocks, as a judgment consists in a logical 
relation between two or more concepts. Judgments evidently can be true or false, or in 
between, if the concepts or the relation expressed in the judgment give way to a 
certain ambiguity.  
 
    In a certain sense one can attribute also to concepts the qualification of true of false. 
This is meaningful if one considers the agreement with the accepted language in this 
specific discipline, or if one considers the adequacy to arrive at a consistent formal 
approach. The great scientist is the person who is able to understand the full richness 
of concepts and who is able to transmit this richness to non-peers in such a superb 
way that those arrive at the "Aha-Erlebnis". The wrong choice or the less adequate 
formulation of concepts can inhibit largely the progress in science for individuals and 
even for the whole scientific community, as the history of science demonstrates. As 
an example of a mental barrier one may remind the consequences of the mechanistic 
world picture with roots in Laplace and especially in 19th century classical physics. In 
this view the starting point is the axiom that all physical phenomena can be explained 
by means of spatial movement of well-defined bodies and particles. Consequently, the 
two new physical theories of the 20th century, relativity and quantum mechanics, are 
missing completely intelligibility. 
 
    Closely related to the concepts is the intellectual capacity of man that is called 
intuition. The common expression after having received a satisfactory explication "I 
see" indicates that the process of understanding is not only the sequence of rational 
steps, in traditional logic called syllogism. At a certain moment the explanation is 
sufficient, one sees (in Latin intuere) the solution of the intellectual problem. It is 
remarkable that the classical Greek word for "to see", theorein (θεορειν) seems to 
stress the importance of the intuitive contribution in a theoretical approach. Often the 
reverse is happening. The scientist intuitively sees the solution of a problem; the work 
now is to prove formally the correctness of the intuitive approach. This double 
structure in the cognitive process reveals the double structure in the rational activity 
of human beings: on the one hand the formal, analytical approach based on reasoning 
and on the other the intuitive, synthetic and creative approach where one sees directly 
and immediately the solution of an intellectual problem. Both are necessary and have 
to be developed in scientific education. The formal, mathematical approach is largely 
used in science and leads to results expressed in the Cartesian ideal of being clare et 
distincte. Support of a computer can simplify largely this kind of intellectual effort. 
The intuitive way seems to be especially necessary for artists and others involved in 
creative activities. Nevertheless one should bear in mind that even in the exact 
sciences creativity is necessary to arrive at major breakthroughs. Max van Laue 
explains (von Laue 1950):  
The tenet that the scientific experience of truth in any sense is "theoria," i.e., a view of God, 
might be said sincerely about the best of them. 
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Intuition, being able to synthesize and creativity therefore have to be developed 
besides the ability to carry out a formal, analytical approach. Once again one could 
refer to (Lena 2014). 
 
4. Hierarchy in the material world and the analogy of being 
 
In this section we will examine in detail the ontological basis of complexity. The main 
question that will be discussed is whether the whole is more than the constituent parts. 
In other words, is there real something new in the complex being, or is complexity 
something more related to our way of thinking. Does it mean that we call it complex 
because the whole exceeds our restricted intellectual power or the capacity of our 
computers? In order to arrive at an answer we carry out an analysis based on the 
metaphysics of Aristotle and Aquinas and make use of the analogy of being. In 
addition we use the distinction of material and formal principles (hylomorphism) to 
clarify the ontological structure of material beings. 
  
    When analyzing the word "to be" one discovers a very peculiar structure. One can 
speak about the being of a man, an idea, a dog, an atom, a droplet of water, a specific 
color, or even of the being of First Cause. The being of all of these realities is surely 
not the same, as the being of a droplet or an atom is much weaker and less 
pronounced than the being of a dog or a man. The being of an idea is even more 
peculiar, as it has to be in someone or something else, in the head of someone or 
written down - materialized - in a piece of paper or another information carrier. An 
idea participates in the being of something or someone else. One therefore can say 
that 'to be' indicates different relations, but all seem to belong to a certain class. As 
Aristotle says in the Metaphysics: Being can be said in many ways (Aristotle 
Metaphysics). In other words being is not univocal, it does not express 
unambiguously always the same relation, but also not equivocal like the word 'mint', a 
name of a plant or the name of a place where coins are produced. These kind of 
peculiar words in the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition are denominated as being 
analogical, because they exhibit certain proportionality. The being of man relates to a 
man as the being of an atom to an atom. They are predicated as more or less and allow 
certain levels within a hierarchy. This hierarchy is formed by observing that the lower 
beings participate in the being (esse) of the higher beings. For a recent study of the 
analogy of being including the impact on theological discussions, see (White 2011). 
 
    One, true, good and beautiful are the transcendental properties that belong to any 
being. In common experience this is implicitly assumed. If we count things, we count 
units that have certain wholeness. If we consider something as being true, good or 
beautiful we implicitly assume that it is something with its own being. Consider an 
everyday situation with a dog approaching us and our comment would be: "Look at 
these billions of molecules approaching us." Or even worse when contemplating the 
beautiful face of a young woman one is in love with: "What a beautiful arrangement 
of biological cells". Our common sense refuses to accept this mental reduction of the 
whole to its material parts. Intuitively we are able to grasp that one is dealing with a 
whole. 
 
    Closely related to these transcendentals, other words have a similar analogical 
character. The substance is one of these. With this expression one denominates things 
(or persons in the case of intelligent beings) that have their own being (esse), unlike 
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an idea that exist in an intelligent being. In the case of a human being one easily 
accepts that one is dealing with a substance. In the case of an atom or an electron it 
will depend on the context or environment one is considering. If one considers them 
as a unity with their own being one can speak about a substance, otherwise it is part of 
a substance (in the case of an atom in a human being) or an agglomeration of 
substances (if one considers elementary particles). It is worthwhile to quote in some 
extension A.G.M. van Melsen (Van Melsen 1982): 
We do not hesitate to use this concept (substantia) with respect to human beings and animals, 
but we encounter increasing difficulties when we are applying it to plants, minerals, liquids, 
gases, beams of light, etc. In the latter cases the concept substantia seems to be devoid of any 
meaning. It does not amaze us, therefore, that science dropped this concept from its 
vocabulary. Yet with respect to human beings and animals the concept substantia cannot be 
missed whereas, difficult as it may be to indicate other concrete substances, there can be no 
doubt that material entities do exist. This implies that the analogy of the concept substantia 
should be fully taken into account. 
 
being (ens) material 
principles 
formal  
principles           
discipline(s) 
involved 
nation    ‘matter’ 
involved: 
human beings 
laws of nature, moral 
laws, leading to 
concepts of politics, 
e.g. democracy   
politology, 
humanities, 
sociology 
man      matter involved 
(a.o. celles, 
organs) similar 
to other mammals) 
laws of nature, moral 
laws, leading to 
concepts related to 
human beings, a.o. 
ethics   
medicine, 
biology, 
humanities 
animal    matter involved 
(a.o. cells)  
laws of nature, leading 
to concepts related to 
animals, e.g. growth, 
reproduction       
biology,  
physiology 
biological cell matter involved, 
a.o molecules   
laws of nature, leading 
to concepts related to 
cells, e.g. cell 
division      
biology, 
chemistry 
artifact  
(e.g. airplane) 
 
 
matter involved 
(a.o. atoms,  
molecules) 
 
laws of nature, leading 
to concepts related to 
airplanes, a.o. travel 
comfort 
physics, 
engineering, 
ergonomics 
molecule matter involved 
(a.o. atoms) 
 
laws of nature, leading 
to concepts related to 
molecules, a.o. heat of 
formation 
physics, 
chemistry 
atom    matter involved 
(a.o. protons) 
laws of nature, leading 
to concepts related to 
atoms, a.o. 
radioactivity 
physics 
proton  matter involved 
(a.o. quarks) 
laws of nature, leading 
to concepts related to 
protons  
Physics 
 
Table I: Hierarchy of beings with increasing complexity 
 
    On the basis of the analogy of being one can establish a hierarchy in beings with 
increasing complexity, see Table I. Simultaneously with this hierarchy an ordering in 
the different scientific disciplines is obtained. This table is inspired in part by 
(Anderson 1972) who discusses in detail the layers related to physics without direct 
reference to metaphysical issues. A similar approach can also be found by the 
philosopher Herman Dooyeweerd. He considers a structure of modal aspects of reality 
with new law-spheres (Dooyeweerd 1936). The hierarchy in the table is established 
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not in a unique way, as different point of views are possible. The first column in Table 
I indicates the beings or substances in consideration. Referring to Aristotelian 
hylomorphism, in the next two columns the material and formal principles (causes) 
are given that determine these beings. Each higher level is based on the foregoing 
levels (not necessarily all of them) and adds something new mainly due to the 
increased richness in the formal principles. The new total being is more than the sum 
of the parts. This is indicated explicitly by adding in the column of the formal 
principles some of the new concepts that come up at each level.  
 
    As intuition is needed to understand the full richness of these terms a purely 
formalized, quantitative approach using the concepts of the lower levels is not 
sufficient to arrive at an understanding of the concepts in the higher level. It happened 
often that the ordering and deeper understanding of concepts in a higher level has led 
to new disciplines. Sometimes, however, the new discipline does not make use of the 
disciplines of the lower levels. To give an example, the knowledge of nuclear physics 
does not help in the development of a scientifically sound human ethic. It will, 
however, be strictly necessarily in nuclear medicine. 
 
    With the scheme of Table I it becomes clear that reductionism cannot be the 
solution for dealing scientifically with the objects of the higher level. At the level of a 
human being or an animal, all will agree that, after a sufficiently long process of 
decomposition, one will end up with atoms or nuclear particles. This relates, however, 
only to the material principle of the substance in question. The formal principle that 
determines the arrangement of atoms and provides the strong unity, however, exceeds 
completely the formal principles of the underlying layers. In (Anderson 1972) it is 
argued that even in the realm of physics, systems composed of simple physical objects 
exhibit new phenomena that cannot be described without new concepts.  
 
    The role of the disciplines and the relation with the different levels in Table I is 
indicated in the last column. One should bear in mind that the list of disciplines in 
every level is not exhaustive, without perhaps the lowest two or three levels. At the 
higher levels complexity increases and only a multidisciplinary approach will result in 
real progress. Consider, for example, the case of a human artifact, the airplane. For 
the design and realization of a new generation of transatlantic jets a large group of 
specialists have to collaborate: materials scientists, physicists, all kind of engineers, 
safety specialists knowing the legal rules of the different countries, economists, artists 
for the design of the cabin, and so on. All these specialists use their own science and 
knowledge with their own concepts. Their intuition is needed to arrive at a "good" 
airplane. The quality "good" cannot be formalized as the optimizations proposed by 
the different disciplines are in a certain way contradictory. Safety requirements, for 
example, require mostly adaptations that lead to additional load during flight and lead 
therefore to less cost-effective solutions. 
 
5. A tentative philosophy of complexity 
 
In the forgoing the role of cognitive processes in human beings and the importance of 
intuition and the elaboration of concepts have been discussed. This has led to the 
proposal of a hierarchy in scientific disciplines on the basis of the analogy of being 
and the distinction between material and formal principles. Herewith the main 
building blocks are now available for a tentative philosophy of complexity. The 
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starting point is the observation that in all levels of science there are things, beings or 
substances that have their wholeness or unity (unum): the whole is more than the sum 
of parts. The fact that we can and in fact do count protons, atoms, molecules, 
airplanes, cells, animals, human beings and nations indicate that common sense 
considers these as gifted with sufficient individuality. Molecules, e.g., in certain 
aspects form a unity that exceeds the pure geometric arrangement of the constituent 
atoms. For experiments that illustrate the relation of the whole and the parts one may 
refer to the discussion of the hydrogen atom and molecule in (Driessen 2015). 
 
    The different levels of beings form a hierarchy, as the higher beings can be 
reduced, at least regarding the material principles, to the lower beings. This hierarchy 
is not uniquely defined and may exhibit branches. The artifacts (the airplane in Table 
I) seem to follow a route different from the natural living beings. In all levels one 
should bear in mind that beings and substances are analogical terms. If there is a 
sufficiently strong formal reason to consider the unity of an object one can address it 
as a standalone being, a substance. That is not in contradiction to that in a different 
approach one focusses only on the individual constituent parts. A human being, for 
example, has a very strong unity, in fact the strongest in the material world. But 
considering the physics of x-ray absorption of a human thorax, only the distribution 
and characteristics of the individual atoms are relevant. 
 
    The distinction between organic and inorganic, living and non-living, natural or 
man-made beings or substances is more or less important, but does not lead to a 
different approach in the scheme of Table I. The unity is strongest in living beings 
which especially in the higher forms exhibit individual and, in the case of human 
beings, even personal characteristics. When ascending the hierarchy, beings are 
increasingly rich or complex with regard to the formal aspects. The information 
needed to understand the relevant concepts is rapidly increasing. The material aspects 
in a certain sense are participating in the increasing complexity. The constituent 
material parts of the beings of the higher levels are not low level beings. Only very 
strong violent causes may reduce, for example, a dog to the level of elementary 
particles. To do so, conventional means like burning, will not be sufficient. One needs 
the reaction of a nuclear bomb.  
 
    Aquinas already observed that the lowest level of material, the so-called materia 
prima, cannot receive straightforwardly the high-level forms. Instead a certain order 
has to be respected (Aquinas Metaphysics): 
Yet even though something is generated from that kind of non-being which is being in 
potentiality, still a thing is not generated from every kind of non-being, but different things 
come from different matters. For everything capable of being generated has a definite matter 
from which it comes to be, because there must be a proportion between form and matter. For 
even though first matter is in potentiality to all forms, it nevertheless receives them in a certain 
order. For first of all it is in potency to the forms of the elements, and through the intermediary 
of these, insofar as they are mixed in different proportions, it is in potency to different forms. 
Hence not everything can come to be directly from everything else unless perhaps by being 
resolved into first matter. 
 
    In a famous paragraph in the Summa contra Gentiles these ideas are worked out in 
more detail. Aquinas considers explicitly this gradation in forms and observes that 
complete beings, e.g. elements, can be considered as matter for complex bodies, 
which he called mixed bodies. In certain sense he is in agreement with modern 
biology and confirms biological evolution in as far as for him no new materials are 
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needed to form plants, animals or even humans. The only novelty is the form of the 
higher level, the information that actualizes the suitable disposed matter. This high-
level form is called soul according to the Aristotelian expression psyche. One has to 
bear in mind that in the current use of the language, ‘soul’ is restricted to the human 
soul, i.e. to persons. When Aristotle and Aquinas use psyche (soul) in connection with 
plants and trees they evidently do not attribute to them a personal character. In 
(Aquinas contra Gentiles) one can read: 
Now, among the acts pertaining to forms, certain gradations are found. Thus, prime matter is 
in potency, first of all, to the form of an element. When it is existing under the form of an 
element it is in potency to the form of a mixed body; that is why the elements are matter for 
the mixed body. Considered under the form of a mixed body, it is in potency to a vegetative 
soul, for this sort of soul is the act of a body. In turn, the vegetative soul is in potency to a 
sensitive soul, and a sensitive one to an intellectual one. 
 
    In the previous section emphasis was laid of the material aspects in the hierarchy of 
Table I. Now the focus is more on the formal aspects. In the high level beings the 
number of disciplines contributing to an adequate understanding is rapidly increasing. 
Only a multidisciplinary approach is able to tackle the large number of relevant 
phenomena. It is interesting to observe that especially in the artifacts non-technical 
issues are gaining importance. Ergonomics lead to user-friendly apparatus. Economic 
and legal arguments are often decisive when selecting which apparatus will be taken 
into production out of a number of technically possible solutions. Also ethical aspects 
enter, see for example our previous study related to optical communication (Driessen 
2009). In the bio-industry new phenomena arise, as natural beings are manipulated to 
lead to improved 'natural' products. Also here non-technical issues are involved like: 
Which outer appearance of a tomato will attract buyers? Which taste is wanted by a 
certain group of people? Which legal measures should be taken to avoid serious 
environmental and health effects by uncontrolled genetic manipulation? 
 
    The characteristics of a complex system include emergence of new properties, as 
has been mentioned in section 2. In Table I it is shown explicitly that at all levels of 
the proposed hierarchy new concepts arise or emerge. Butterfield describes it as 
(Butterfield 2011): 
I take emergence as behaviour that is novel and robust relative to some comparison class. 
The comparison class represents the elements that constitute the system at a higher 
level. Mittelstrass differentiates between strong and weak emergence. He refers 
explicitly to complex systems and provides the following definition (Mittelstrass 
2014): 
Emergence says again that it is impossible to use characteristics of elements and the 
interrelations between these to describe characteristics of ensembles or make predictions about 
them. The core element of a strong emergence thesis is a non-derivability or non-
explainability hypothesis of the system characteristics shaped from the characteristics of the 
system components. An emergent characteristic is non-derivable; its occurrence is in this 
sense unexpected and unpredictable. Weak emergence is limited to the difference of the 
characteristics of systems and system components and is compatible with the theoretical 
explainability of the system characteristics. Weak emergence in turn is essentially a 
phenomenon of complexity. 
 
    Butterfield (2011) comments in his paper on the More is Different slogan of 
(Anderson 1972) and shows that in many cases emergence and reductionism are 
compatible. It seems to be that this is exactly the case when one is dealing with weak 
emergence according to Mittelstrass. It is worthwhile to quote Butterfield in his paper 
Less is Different (2011): 
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‘More is different!’, proclaimed Philip Anderson in a famous paper (1972) advocating the 
autonomy of what are often called ‘special’ or ‘higher-level’ sciences or theories. A catchy 
slogan, indeed. But his reductionist opponents, such as Weinberg (1987), could have matched 
it (…). ‘Less is more’. Hence my title. For my main point will be that although emergence is 
usually opposed to reduction, many examples exhibit both. So my title, ‘Less is different’, is 
meant as an irenic combination of the two parties’ slogans. 
 
    The scientific study of the concepts at the higher levels in Table 1 , their 
generalizations and their relations may give rise to new disciplines. In a 
multidisciplinary project one of the greatest problems is the "language" of the 
different disciplines. This language is mainly based on well-established concepts in 
the individual discipline. Being able to understand the concepts without the ballast of 
the formalized discipline-related approach is one of the greatest challenges in such a 
collaboration. Once again it is stressed that the acquisition of the adequate concepts is 
largely based on intuition. The related 'Aha-Erlebnis' is not so much the result of a 
deep analysis as of a synthetic view. 
 
    If one agrees with the last statement that each level brings up really new concepts 
then the disciplines at each level have their fundamental aspects, i.e. on each level 
fundamental science is possible and needed. Fundamental science, therefore, is not 
restricted to certain fields of physics or other low-lying levels in the hierarchy of 
Table I. Even in artifacts, concepts may arise that need the academic environment to 
be understood and deepened in an adequate way. This scientific work eventually will 
acquire an applied character if the new knowledge is used for creating or 
manipulating things for a specific purpose. This view is not generally accepted as the 
ideal of any real science is for many scientists still the Cartesian clare et distincte. It is 
not a purely academic discussion, as the science curricula at High Schools and 
universities depend sensitively on the view on science. And, not to forget, the 
distribution of research money, too. 
 
    Within the scientific community some scientists adhere a similar opinion as given 
in the previous sections. The French Nobel-Prize winner Pierre-Gilles de Gennes 
complains about the prejudice of French culture, probably not restricted to that 
country (De Gennes 1994): 
I would now like to speak about a typical prejudice of the French culture, a prejudice inherited 
from Auguste Comte's positivism. This 19th century philosopher built up his glory by 
establishing a classification of sciences. At the top of the hierarchy, mathematics; at the 
bottom, chemistry which, according to him, "hardly deserves to be considered a science ”(!), 
in the middle, astronomy and physics. This classification excluded geography and mineralogy, 
sciences that he considered concrete and descriptive, thus keeping only theoretical, abstract 
and general sciences. 
As mentioned above, P.W. Anderson published a similar hierarchy of disciplines as 
given in Table I and states (Anderson 1972): 
At each stage entirely new laws, concepts, and generalizations are necessary, requiring 
inspiration and creativity to just as great a degree as in the previous one. 
 
    At this point one could be satisfied with the result obtained. The hierarchy of Table 
I has been established and hopefully new insight has been enabled regarding the 
relation between the parts and the whole in a complex system.  But it is common for 
children and philosophers to continue asking the question: why? In our case, why is 
there a hierarchy in beings, see Table I, why is there something like self-organization 
and emergence of properties. Mariano Artigas provides an attractive view that could 
lead to an answer (Artigas 2002): 
The Role of Philosophy as a Guide in Complex Scientific and Technological Processes, 
A. Driessen, 17-9-2016  Page 13 of 16 
 
I used to say that information is "materialized rationality". It includes plans that are stored in 
spatio-temporal structures. It guides the successive formation of increasingly complex 
patterns. Information is stored, displayed, integrated, coded and decoded in the different 
natural systems and processes. (….) 
The corresponding idea of God is that of a Creator who has conceived the natural dynamism, 
and uses it to produce, according to the natural laws created by Him, a world of successive 
levels of emerging novelties. 
This view is not new, already Aquinas explicitly considered this approach (Aquinas 
Physics): 
Nature is nothing other than the ratio of a certain art, namely, the divine, inscribed in things, 
by which things themselves move to a determinate end: just as if the master shipbuilder could 
impart to the wood something from which it could move itself to taking on the form of the 
ship. 
 
    Both, Artigas and Aquinas refer to rationality as the basis of the emergence of 
higher level beings. In main-stream biological evolution theory the term rationality is 
avoided and the term chance is used instead. One may consider this as is a matter of 
taste, as science on its own cannot distinguish between chance or rational intention 
(Driessen 2010). To make this distinction one has to leave the realm of natural science 
(Naturwissenschaften) and enter the realm of humanities (Geisteswissenschaften), 
more specifically the realm of metaphysics (meta-biology) or more general 
philosophy. It is philosophical reflection on the scientific results that allows this 
distinction. An example of this reflection on a meta-level in the line of the ideas of 
Aquinas and Artigas is presented by M. I. George (George 2008): 
The fact that random processes can result in living things arising from non-living things 
presupposes the existence of not just any sort of matter, but one which has the potency to be 
formed into living things; further, not just any sort of agents will do; but there must be ones 
apt to impart the appropriate forms to the appropriate matter. In addition, in order for these 
supposedly randomly formed living things to survive and reproduce, there must be a habitat 
favorable to them, and the possibility of its development also needs explanation. Just as it is 
luck that one gets a royal flush, but not that one can get it - the deck is designed that way, so 
too it may be luck that this or that organism appear, but it cannot be luck that it is able to 
appear. 
    It may be redundant, but once again it is important to stress that is a matter of taste. 
The scientific facts alone do not oblige to accept or refute the chance- nor the design-
hypothesis. The aphorism of A. Suarez Evolution is the smartest form of creation 
(Suarez 2016) is a good summary of a clear choice: accepting all scientific results on 
evolution, accepting a rational creator but rejecting creationism. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
Looking back to the previous sections one sees that most of the discussion has been in 
the field of philosophy. It is surely not suprising, as only philosophy can deal with the 
whole hierarchy of beings. More precisely, one can remark that without a 
metaphysical basis a discussion about the different disciplines is missing the common 
link. This leads to probably the most important conclusion that the acquisition of 
philosophical concepts and insight helps to clarify the complex relation between the 
different disciplines of science and helps to deal with complex scientific or 
technological problems. 
 
    A second conclusion is about the necessity to develop the capacity for scientific 
intuition. Success in a multidisciplinary setting is closely related to the understanding 
of the basic concepts of all disciplines involved. And this is only possible with a well-
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developed capacity for intuition. It is only on this basis that inspiration and creativity 
can push forward the scientific frontiers.  
 
    A third conclusion is that philosophy is a good school for developing the intuitive 
capacity of scientist as it is based on the subtle interplay of concepts in a logic system. 
One therefore should stimulate that philosophy be an integral part of the education at 
High School and Universities. 
 
    Finally one could remark that the occurrence of complex systems in nature and 
technology together with the emergence of new properties and laws is a non-trivial 
issue. For it relates to the big questions of science, specifically about the origin of 
information, and eventually to the question of the existence of God, see, e.g., (Carrol 
2016) and (Tanzella-Nitti 2016). 
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